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Forming early relationships increases entrepreneurial ventures’ chances of survival and success 
by allowing access to critical resources from partners. However, since not all ventures achieve 
their desired goals through collaboration due to uncertainty, such relationships are sometimes 
abandoned. This paper investigates the costs of ties that have gone awry in the context of 
venture capital investments. We conjecture that the adverse perceptions of signals associated 
with tie discontinuation reduce an investee venture’s valuation in the follow-on round of 
financing by partially deterring prospective investors, particularly higher-quality ones, from 
joining the syndicate. By examining large-sample evidence that supports our theory, we 
suggest that early entrepreneurial ties to venture capitalists may be a double-edged sword, 
especially in light of the costs of the discontinuation. 









Chris Dixon, a general partner at top-tier venture capital (VC) firm Andreessen Horowitz said: 
“This investor signaling has a huge effect on venture financing dynamics. If Sequoia wants to 
invest, so will every other investor. If Sequoia gave you seed money before but now doesn’t 
want to follow on, you’re probably dead.”1 Voicing similar concerns, Jon Sakoda, co-manager 
of the seed program at New Enterprise Associates — one of the largest and most active VC 
firms globally — recalled, “we had talked to lots of entrepreneurs or other seed investors about 
whether or not our participation in the next rounds would actually undermine our relationships 
with entrepreneurs.”2 A scenario that involves the non-repetition of ties with venture investors 
elucidates a source of tension for entrepreneurial ventures: what are the downsides of forming 
early relationships when investors discontinue their investments? With limited resource 
endowments, entrepreneurial ventures may have little choice but to turn to investors, but 
lacking status and power, they have little control over their investors’ actions (Pahnke, Katila, 
& Eisenhardt, 2015) and other prospective investors' adverse perceptions of such actions 3 
Research to date considers early relationships as an opportunity for entrepreneurial 
ventures to grow, develop, and overcome the “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965). Early 
relationships provide entrepreneurs with critical resources from prospective partners and 
investors, along with access to advantageous social positions (Alvarez-Garrido & Dushnitsky, 
 
1 http://cdixon.org/2010/03/12/the-importance-of-investor-signaling-in-venture-pricing/  
2 https://techcrunch.com/2013/07/12/ask-a-vc-neas-jon-sakoda-on-why-the-venture-firm-makes-seed-
investments-and-more/ 
3 “If you sometimes follow-on and sometimes don’t, then not following-on is a signal to the new investors 
that they’re making a mistake (signaling again.)” wrote Jerry Neumann from NeuVC 
(http://reactionwheel.net/2017/06/venture-follow-on-and-the-kelly-criterion.html). Additionally, Y Combinator 
(a prominent accelerator) launched a growth fund and emphasized in their strategy that they would not invest in 
the early stage investments of their own ventures (https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/15/former-twitter-coo-ali-
rogwhani-to-lead-y-combinators-growth-fund/ ); When asked about signaling risk and whether Y Combinator 
could doom its portfolio ventures if it does not back them as they mature, Rowghani shrugged off the concern: 
“We’re staying away from early stage precisely because we want to avoid [the] signaling issue, which is most 
acute when companies are just departing from [the accelerator program of] Y Combinator, when we have more 






2015; Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008). However, this perspective ignores the reality 
that young ventures might not achieve their desired goalsthrough collaborations; thus, these 
collaborations are discontinued (organizations that are more established also frequently 
dissolve their ties, see Kale & Singh, 2009). During the period from 1985 to 2007, about 24% 
of the entrepreneurial ventures we studied lost at least one investor collaboration. This is rather 
surprising, since both anecdotal evidence and empirical research have suggested that investors 
are expected to participate in follow-on financing in order to benefit from financial returns, 
especially in the case of positive outcomes. Early relationships can be sub-optimal mismatches, 
as they are subject to the extensive uncertainty and unpredictability that surround the 
development of young ventures. Therefore, given the difficulty that entrepreneurs have in 
identifying partners with the kinds of resources and expertise that would increase their chances 
of success, and taking into consideration the somewhat prevalent discontinuation of investment 
relationships, it becomes critical to investigate the performance cost to the venture resulting 
from the non-repetition of collaborative ties (hereafter, VC withdrawal).4 
For ventures lacking a repetition of ties by one of their existing VC investors, this study 
examines the financial outcomes (i.e., their valuation at the time at which the capital is raised 
and the amount of capital raised) and the underlying mediating factors related to the venture’s 
likelihood of attracting new investors (especially those possessing desirable attributes, such as 
status and reputation). Two plausible theoretical mechanisms link how a VC firm’s decision 
not to reinvest in a focal new funding round affects the portfolio venture’s (hereafter, venture) 
prospects in that focal funding round. The first trivial mechanism is that the VC firm becomes 
privy to private, insider information on the venture’s poor prospects, and hence the withdrawal 
decision is a negative signal of venture quality, which is eventually revealed in the venture’s 
 
4 In this study, we use the terms ‘withdrawal’ and ‘non-repetition of ties’ interchangeably. Note that when 
a VC firm stops investing in subsequent rounds, it can retain its (diluted) equity in the venture or sell its equity in 
the secondary market. In the latter case, the VC firm fully terminates its relationship with the venture (i.e., tie 





adverse financials in that focal funding round. We call this the “private information” 
mechanism.  
The second mechanism is that the withdrawal adversely influences the perceptions of 
new potential VC firms about focal venture’s quality (perceived quality), regardless of its 
underlying true quality (which is difficult to observe directly). Potential new investors, making 
decisions under uncertainty and information asymmetry, face an adverse selection issue 
because they are unsure of the focal venture’s quality — since what they observe is the 
withdrawal by the currently invested VC firm, they can potentially interpret that as a negative 
signal. We call this the “adverse selection” mechanism.  
At the extreme, if an insider chooses not to participate in the follow-on round for 
reasons unrelated to the venture’s underlying value and prospects of success, it could lead a 
perfectly viable venture to experience a negative fundraising performance. For example, 
corporate VC firms may shift their focus to other opportunities on an ad hoc basis (Dushnitsky, 
2012; Gaba & Meyer, 2008), which may disrupt their follow-on investment in a particular 
venture. Therefore, it becomes difficult for other potential investors to determine whether such 
a withdrawal was due to changing corporate priorities or if the corporate VC firm possessed 
certain information that caused it to discontinue its investment. Therefore, withdrawing VC 
exposes the venture and the rest of the syndicate to “adverse selection” consequences, even if 
the venture continues to progress well. 
 To distinguish these two confounding mechanisms, in our econometric analysis we 
assume that “private information” about the prospects of the venture is an omitted variable (i.e., 
unobservable). The omitted variable linked to “private information” can bias the “adverse 
selection” consequences of withdrawal on a venture’s valuation unless appropriate econometric 
methods are used to address potential endogeneity concerns arising from omitted variable bias. 





Prabhala, 2007). This approach allows the impact of VC withdrawal on the venture’s valuation 
not to be biased by the confounding effect of “private information” on the underlying, yet 
unobservable, quality of the venture. Furthermore, “adverse selection” concerns are especially 
important under conditions of uncertainty: the greater the uncertainty (for example, during the 
early stages of venture development) about the quality of the venture, the greater the negative 
impact of the withdrawal on the venture’s valuation in the focal round of funding.5 We also 
investigate how increased adverse selection concerns from VC withdrawal deter new 
prospective investors (especially those that with high-status and high-reputation qualities) and 
how this lack of interest from new prospective investors mediates the negative relationship 
between VC withdrawal and a venture’s valuation. To test our hypotheses, we use VC 
investment data from the Thomson SDC Platinum database over a span of 22 years. 
This paper offers two contributions. First, we extend the understanding of how 
relationships (or a lack thereof) can affect young ventures. Prior research has mostly considered 
the benefits of early relationships and offered a consensus on the positive outcomes for ventures 
that have secured venture investment (Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Hsu, 2006; Puri & Zarutskie, 
2012). In contrast, we add to the limited but growing body of work that underscores the 
potential downsides (from the entrepreneur’s perspective) associated with investment 
relationships. These include taking a company public prematurely as a means of grandstanding 
(Gompers, 1996), leaking sensitive information to other portfolio ventures (Pahnke et al., 
2015), or exposing valuable technologies to competitors (Colombo & Shafi, 2016; Diestre & 
Rajagopalan, 2012; Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Katila et al., 2008). In contrast to the ex-ante 
 
5 We have performed a series of additional tests that reinforce our confidence in the adverse selection 
mechanism. First, we construct a “treatment” group where each venture with withdrawal is paired with one 
“control” venture based on similar observable characteristics. The matching attempts to mimic randomization by 
creating a sample of ventures that received the treatment that is comparable on all observed characteristics to a 
sample of ventures that did not receive the treatment. We find similar results using matching methods. Second, 
we report similar findings in the sample of ventures with successful exits, acting as a proxy for high-quality 





considerations for tie formation, the ex-post consequences of the non-repetition of ties are the 
focus of this work, especially when these decisions are made at the discretion of a high-powered 
exchange party. By documenting several negative consequences of VC withdrawal for 
entrepreneurial ventures, we add to the existing work that has explored the link between the 
negative consequences of financial liquidity shocks on VC investors and the fundraising ability 
of new ventures (Townsend, 2015).  
Our second contribution is to integrate more closely the literature on partner selection 
(who forms ties with whom) (Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Sorenson & Stuart, 
2008) and signaling theory (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). While the conversation 
on signaling opportunities for young ventures imbued with extant information asymmetry has 
grown to become an important theoretical contribution to understanding the various outcomes, 
including valuations or materializing valuable ties with partners (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; 
Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Ozmel, Reuer, & Gulati, 2013; Reuer, Tong, & Wu, 2012; Sanders 
& Boivie, 2004; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999), this theoretical framework has been less 
engaged in explaining the quality of the selected partners and how this heterogeneity can 
mediate the effect of signals on valuations. Therefore, we specifically focus on whether signals 
facilitate access to exchange partners that have valuable intangible assets, such as 
organizational reputation and status (Washington & Zajac, 2005). In doing so, we extend prior 
work on signaling that only tends to control for the heterogeneity of partners instead of 
embracing it as an important mediating factor (Pollock & Gulati, 2007; Stern, Dukerich, & 
Zajac, 2014). 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
In an attempt to depart from prior research on the benefits of relationships for young ventures, 
researchers have recently explored the potential negative consequences of forming some ties 





Wang, & Hallen, 2015). In focusing on the negative consequences of the ties formed, this line 
of work overlooked the frequently observed issue of discontinued ties and their consequences. 
Moreover, only a small body of research has considered tie dissolutions (Ahuja, Polidoro, & 
Mitchell, 2009; Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi, & Rowley, 2010; Greve, Mitsuhashi, & Baum, 
2013). Our perspective here differs from previous work, as we consider the performance 
consequences of tie discontinuations in the context of young entrepreneurial ventures.  
What motivates entrepreneurial ventures to seek investment ties with intermediaries? 
Entrepreneurial ventures typically begin with limited resource endowments and seek partners 
to obtain resources such as capital, complementary assets, contacts, and advice. Extant research 
has documented the myriad positive effects of such ties on venture performance, ranging from 
innovation (Kortum & Lerner, 2000) to growth and the likelihood of going public (Chemmanur 
et al., 2010; Cumming & Johan, 2013; Puri & Zarutskie, 2012). However, the entrepreneur’s 
weaker position in an investment relationship gives them little control over their partner’s 
subsequent decisions (Garg, 2013). This is so because investors typically ask for control rights; 
even though they are not major shareholders, they ask for board rights in order to take control 
of the venture should problems arise. In addition, VCs can also non-contractually control the 
venture’s fate. Even though VCs invest in stages to elicit more effort from entrepreneurs (to 
address moral hazard problems), they have the discretion to discontinue. The following 
discussion expands on a few antecedents of tie discontinuations. 
The decision to withdraw financial support may be related to a venture’s 
underperformance. A VC learns more about the venture over time through monitoring 
(Sahlman, 1990). When the venture underperforms, or fails to achieve the milestones that are 
set a priori, the VC might update its expectations about the venture’s prospects downwards 
(Gompers, 1995). Accordingly, the withdrawal should reflect the negative “private 





probability. Note that the VC’s evaluation of future success is arguably subjective and made 
under uncertainty, as evidenced by the highly skewed returns of VC investors (Cochrane, 2005; 
Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). 
The VC’s decision to withdraw from an investment may be unrelated to the venture’s 
performance but related to a host of other factors, especially when other syndicate members 
choose to recommit their resources in the focal new funding round. One reason for withdrawal 
may be financial constraints. After the collapse of the technology bubble, investors with greater 
Internet exposure (who presumably faced more liquidity pressures) were less likely to continue 
to participate in follow-on rounds of non-Internet companies (Townsend, 2015). VCs may face 
contractual prohibitions from investing further from the same fund in the venture’s follow-on 
round (e.g., when VCs have contractual agreements with their limited partners only to invest 
in seed or early-stage ventures and their focal investee venture has reached the growth or 
expansion stage). Moreover, they are often contractually prohibited from using other funds 
under their management because limited partners perceive such cross-fund investment as a 
moral hazard problem.  
Besides the limited fund size, uncertainties regarding technological development and 
market adoption trajectories can result in miscalculations about timing decisions by VCs that 
are under pressure from limited partners that demand (liquid) returns, typically around seven 
to ten years after the fundraising (Cumming & Johan, 2013). Furthermore, conflicts of interest 
among investors might lead to the withdrawal of VCs, and VCs may pursue different goals 
depending on their organizational affiliation. For instance, corporate VCs pursue strategic 
objectives rather than financial returns alone (Dushnitsky, 2012). Principal–principal agency 
conflicts also ensue from the goal incongruence between the independent VCs and VCs 
affiliated with banks, corporations, or governments (Chahine, Arthurs, Filatotchev, & 





(outside options) may induce VCs to redeploy their resources to alternative ventures that offer 
informational advantages, such as lower monitoring costs (Bernstein, Giroud, & Townsend, 
2016). Taken together, a VC’s decision to withdraw may not necessarily relate to the negative 
private information on the quality of the venture learned after investment, but rather relate to 
issues such as those summarized above. 
Venture Valuation  
Given the uncertainties surrounding the survival chances and financial prospects of new 
ventures, VCs face decision-making challenges in their investment process that involve deal 
sourcing, investment selection, valuation, deal structure, post-investment value added, and 
exits. While researchers have studied some aspects of this process extensively (for reviews, see 
Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Da Rin, Hellmann, & Puri, 2011), we overview the few studies on 
valuations of privately held ventures. This area of research is relevant to both venture capitalists 
and entrepreneurs, and despite marked differences with valuations of publicly traded ventures, 
it has received less academic attention (Claes & Vissa, 2017). 
 The valuation of VC-funded and privately held ventures differs from the valuation of 
publicly traded ventures (the latter has amassed a large body of theory and evidence, such as 
the capital asset pricing model). First, the typical targets of venture capital investments are new 
ventures with limited track records and long horizons towards product development and 
commercialization. As a result, historical performance data is unavailable or unreliable to use, 
as in the case of the public market. Second, unlike the passive role held by many investors in 
public ventures, venture investments usually require direct involvement and monitoring that 
can be priced in the valuations (Hsu, 2004). Third, VC investments are illiquid assets, meaning 
that in the short-term, exchange markets for equity shares of privately held ventures are 
inefficient (or lacking) and liquidity events may take many years to take place. Therefore, in 





subjective assessment procedures and is to some extent negotiated based on the relative 
bargaining power of VCs and entrepreneurs (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984).  
 Previous studies that have investigated venture valuation highlight the role of business 
cycles, VC firm characteristics, the industry in which the venture operates, and ultimately the 
quality of the venture’s resources. Valuations increase in line with inflows of capital into 
venture funds (Gompers & Lerner, 2000), typically coinciding with favorable valuations in 
public markets (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2008) and reduced barriers to entry 
for new VC firms in a local market (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2010). Focusing on VC firm 
characteristics, Hsu (2004) notes that high-reputation VCs acquire venture equity at a 10–14% 
discount because of the bundle of services and certifications these investors provide to their 
portfolio ventures. Ge et al. (2005) show that industry-relevant factors, including growth in 
demand and research and development intensity, correlate with valuations of ventures 
operating in that particular industry. Finally, valuations correlate with venture quality. 
Valuations are higher when ventures possess better resource endowments, such as 
organizational human capital in terms of (successful) founding experience, education and 
experience of the management team (Ge et al., 2005; Hsu, 2007), and superior technological 
and marketing capabilities (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013; Block et al., 2013. This category of 
information influences perceptions of the probability that a venture will succeed. Because the 
resource endowments of ventures are rarely sufficient to resolve the uncertainty about their 
underlying quality, investors also use another distinctive category of information on business 
relationships. Stuart et al. (1999) find that affiliations with prominent investment banks and 
strategic alliance partners influence the market value of biotechnology ventures at their initial 
public offering (IPO). The implicit transfer of status across inter-organizational exchange 






 In contrast to the sparse literature focusing on forming ties with (certain preferred) 
exchange partners and their implications for venture valuations, this paper considers the effect 
of discontinued business relationships on venture valuations. Investigating this link improves 
our 'insights into the mechanisms underlying business relationships that may influence venture 
valuations' (beyond those channels offered by prior studies on leasing the reputations of 
exchange parties). Syndication of investments with other investors characterizes the social 
structure of the VC industry. VC firms typically engage in syndication to share information 
and reduce the ex-ante risk associated with evaluating venture investments (Bygrave, 1987) (in 
addition to pooling resources and expertise for post-investment value adding). Given that 
seeking a “second opinion” is one of the rationales for syndication (Brander et al., 2002; Lerner, 
1994), it will be especially valuable for prospective investors when that opinion is perceived to 
be informed and is expressed in the form of whether insider investors provide follow-on 
commitment of capital. Below we explicate how the non-repetition of investor ties alters 
prospective investors’ perceptions of a venture’s valuation. 
VC Withdrawal and Venture Valuation 
Entrepreneurial ventures present information asymmetry problems vis-à-vis prospective 
partners and investors, which are considered to be key impediments to obtaining access to 
resources from investors or collaborators. A limited track record and having only a few tangible 
assets in place raise adverse selection risks for prospective investors and decrease the likelihood 
of deal making. To alleviate problems associated with information asymmetry, prospective 
investors value signals that separate the wheat from the chaff, and entrepreneurs, in turn, use 
signals to shape potential investors’ assessments of the latent potential of their ventures.  
 Prior research has shown how the valuation of ventures is influenced by signals of 
quality, such as a stock of technological assets as disclosed in the proven ability to patent (Hsu 





prominent scientists (Higgins & Gulati, 2006), VC backing, along with the amount of VC and 
the proportion of equity owned by VCs (Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Sanders & Boivie, 2004; 
Stuart et al., 1999), and prestigious executives in the top management team or prestigious 
outside directors on the venture’s board (Certo, 2003; Pollock, Chen, Jackson, & Hambrick, 
2010). Overall, given that valuations at the early stage of ventures are negotiated rather than 
calculated (Hsu, 2004, 2007), prospective investors, faced with considerable uncertainty about 
the potential of the venture, appreciate the value of signals. These are broadly defined as the 
“activities or attributes of individuals in a market which by design or accident, alter the beliefs 
of, or convey information to, other individuals in the market” (Spence, 1974: 1). To this body 
of work, we add VC withdrawal from follow-on financing and highlight how it alters the 
perceptions of potential investors. 
Two mechanisms link how VC withdrawal adversely affects the focal venture’s 
valuation. The first mechanism is that VC withdrawal reflects negative private information 
learned by the investor and is thus a signal of a venture’s poor prospects. A VC firm becomes 
privy to private, insider information on the venture’s prospects through monitoring and often 
by sitting on the venture’s board (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2003). For example, the ability to 
observe first‐hand the progress of the venture enables VCs to develop a sense of how good the 
team will be at executing the next stage of the venture’s growth. If the VC’s private information 
on the underlying value of the venture is negative (for example, if the venture’s underlying 
project has not been making sufficient progress), then the insider VC may decide not to invest 
in the future rounds based on this new negative information. In this scenario, it is not surprising 
to find that a venture’s lower (expected) performance decreases its valuation in the new focal 
funding round. 
An alternative mechanism is that the withdrawal can indicate potential “adverse 





underlying quality of the venture directly or the potential reasons behind the withdrawal. VC 
withdrawal adversely influences the perceptions of prospective investors on the potential of the 
venture for the following reasons. First, the alignment of interests between insiders and new 
shareholders is reduced, potentially causing moral hazard problems (Leland & Pyle, 1977). The 
continued financial commitment of investors (insiders/managers) is credible since insiders 
suffer a penalty if the venture does not perform well. Second, unlike withdrawing VCs with 
access to insider information, new potential investors do not have access to such information 
and can only observe insider VCs’ actions. While new potential investors can gain access to 
some private information, such as audited financials, insiders nevertheless have access to 
privileged soft information that cannot be credibly communicated. Therefore, feeling uncertain 
about the nature of the private information or the underlying reason for the withdrawal, 
potential new VCs interpret it as a negative signal. Even if the underlying reason for withdrawal 
by the VCs was unrelated to the probability of success or the underlying value of the venture, 
the potential investors perceive the focal investment as high risk. Taken together, both these 
mechanisms suggest that VC withdrawal decreases the valuation of the venture in the follow-
on round.6 
 Although it is tempting to believe that the magnitude of both positive and negative 
signals (from obtaining or losing affiliations) are the same, but in opposite directions (based on 
information economics), behavioral decision-making theory suggests that negative signals may 
be more salient than positive signals in shaping the perceptions of prospective investors. One 
of the basic tenets in behavioral decision-making theory is that the rationality of decision-
makers is bounded, rather than perfect (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1979). It is impossible 
for decision-makers to fully evaluate all information because this requires extensive cognitive 
 
6 In our econometric analysis, we manage to distinguish between these two mechanisms and show results 





effort. Such limitations in information processing bring to the fore the idea that salient factors 
within the information typically bias decision-makers (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). For instance, the 
availability bias encourages decision-makers to recall salient information from memory 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In addition, psychology literature has established the negativity 
bias, which is a predisposition to assign greater weight to negative events over good ones in 
decision-making (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 
2001). The overemphasis on negative data in impression formation and recall research is well 
demonstrated in many studies (for reviews, see Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Rozin & Royzman, 
2001) that highlight how evaluators process and remember negative information more 
thoroughly than positive information when making judgments (Fiske, 1991).  
 The primacy of negative information related to withdrawal disproportionally attracts 
the attention of prospective VCs, leading them to discount other factors that might suggest that 
the focal venture would likely succeed. For example, VCs may overlook underlying strengths 
in the market, team, or financials if they give too much weight to the negative impact of VC 
withdrawal. As such, given “the danger of salient information (e.g., the lead entrepreneur is a 
winner) clouding the VC’s judgment” (Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998: 58), salient negative 
information changes the relative importance and use of information factors typically assessed 
in venture proposals (Franke, Gruber, Harhoff, & Henkel, 2008; Zacharakis & Shepherd, 
2001). Evidence from recent behavioral research focusing on how investors make decisions 
has posited that they use a shortcut decision-making heuristic, known as elimination-by-
aspects, to reduce the number of available investment opportunities to a more manageable size 
(Maxwell, Jeffrey, & Levesque, 2011). If an opportunity is diagnosed with a fatal flaw, it is 
rejected in the first stage of the decision-making process, but all other opportunities without 





likely excludes ventures with VC withdrawal from the “consideration” set of investors (Roberts 
& Lattin, 1997) in the first stage of screening proposals. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1. Withdrawal of VC investment ties decreases the valuation of the 
venture in the follow-on round of financing. 
Moderating the Factor of Uncertainty  
We have argued that in venture investing, where uncertainty makes the task of valuation 
challenging, markets will increasingly turn to other, non-traditional information cues such as 
insiders’ continued financial commitment to help with evaluating ventures. However, not all 
ventures suffer from the same degree of informational uncertainty; for example, one factor that 
affects such uncertainty is the development stage of the venture. To bolster our confidence in 
the “adverse selection” channel, we investigate whether the effect of the above hypothesis is 
strongest when uncertainty is greatest (i.e., the venture is in the early stages of development as 
opposed to the late stages of development).  
Uncertainty about a venture’s prospects is reduced as the venture accumulates more 
resources and grows. Stinchcombe (1965) was the first to note “the liability of newness,” which 
refers to the constellation of issues that newly founded ventures face that make them prone to 
failure. Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, and Lyman (1990) consider the liability of innovation, 
whereby new ventures may fail in bringing innovative products to the market because of 
uncertainties in completing the first working prototype that delay the revenue generation 
needed to support the expenses. To overcome these liabilities, venture capitalists can use the 
strategy of staging their investments, which allows them to gather information and monitor the 
progress of ventures (Gompers, 1995). Conversely, entrepreneurs are willing to accept the 
process of staged capital to avoid dilution because they can demonstrate their own ability to 





and resolve informational uncertainty. Consequently, the venture development stage affects the 
amount of information available to investors. 
The stage of the venture development is a moderating factor in the relationship between 
the signal generated from VC withdrawal and the valuation. This is so because in the absence 
of sufficient information about the prospects of the venture to reach an independent conclusion, 
prospective investors place a higher value on signals, a point that is emphasized in the signaling 
literature (Spence, 1974). As a result, the actions of insider VCs should have a particularly 
strong effect on assessments of a venture’s valuation when uncertainty is high. Conversely, 
when prospective investors are confident in their ability to assess a venture’s quality based on 
its record of prior achievements, there is little need to infer its quality on the basis of secondary 
information about what the exchange partners do or their identities (Stuart et al., 1999). Overall, 
since the presence of information asymmetry is lower in the later stages of venture development 
(Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013), the effect of signals on altering investors’ perceptions declines. 
Hypothesis 2. The negative relationship between withdrawal of VC investment ties 
and the valuation of the venture in the follow-on round of financing is amplified for 
early-stage deals compared with late-stage deals. 
New Joining Investors as a Mediating Mechanism  
The first reason why VC withdrawal decreases valuations is that it discourages new investors 
from joining the syndicate. We propose that the valuation benefits of new joining VCs are 
brought about through the increased incentive for insiders to obtain higher valuations. 
As discussed previously, potential new investors interpret the VC withdrawal as a 
negative signal. To the extent that prospective investors perceive a higher risk of adverse 
selection for ventures with VC withdrawal, they would be less willing to enter potential 
collaborations with the focal venture. This observation is consistent with research highlighting 





ties to obtain (complementary) resources (Ragozzino & Reuer, 2011). Given that 
entrepreneurial ventures may have incentives to misrepresent their potential or exaggerate their 
prospects in order to attract partners (Cooper, Woo, & Dunkelberg, 1988), potential partners 
value signals. Entrepreneurs, in turn, use signals to alter potential ventures’ perceptions of the 
latent potential of the venture, thereby facilitating economic exchanges such as equity 
financing, alliances, or acquisitions (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2006; Ozmel et al., 2013; 
Pollock et al., 2010; Ragozzino & Reuer, 2011). We therefore expect that VC withdrawal 
discourages new investors from joining the syndicate (VC withdrawal increases the likelihood 
that the follow-on round of financing is an “inside round,” which refers to a round of funding 
composed of already existing investors.) 
 The decreased likelihood of new joining investors brought about by VC withdrawal 
decreases valuation for the following reason. The “outside round” is typically viewed as 
desirable because bringing new investors into an entrepreneurial venture is beneficial for the 
venture in terms of access to both the expertise and financial resources of the new investors as 
well as indicating a competitive valuation from an outside investor (Admati & Pfleiderer, 
1994). In an outside round, insider VCs (like the founder in the initial round of financing) 
typically have an incentive to push for a high valuation to minimize the dilutive effect of the 
round on their pre-existing interests in the venture. Consistently, follow-on financings in the 
VC industry are typically structured as outside rounds (Lerner, 1994). Broughman and Fried 
(2012: 1105) report that “according to almost every founder in our sample, existing VCs 
actively sought outside financing, and resorted to inside rounds only when outside financing 
was not available.” Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3. New joining VCs partially mediate the relationship between withdrawal 






The Quality of New Joining Investors as a Mediating Mechanism 
Whereas the literature has extensively considered the role of signals in enhancing market 
valuation or in facilitating access to partners (in isolation), the question remains whether signals 
improve the chances of new ventures attracting high-quality partners and, more importantly, 
the mediating effect associated with high-quality partners joining the syndicate. This research 
gap represents an important omission since potential exchange partners have idiosyncratic 
resources that form the basis of their competitive advantage and, by implication, their 
performance (Barney, 1991). For a new venture seeking investment ties, the consideration of 
the investors’ resources (e.g., support network, human capital) is an important issue (Hellmann 
& Puri, 2000, 2002; Ewens & Rhodes-Kropf, 2015).  
 More broadly, a natural step in extending signaling theory in entrepreneurship and 
management is to relax the implicit assumption widely made in prior signaling studies (Ozmel 
et al., 2013; Stern et al., 2014) that partners hold fungible assets (here, cash for VCs) and instead 
focus on whether signals help materialize collaborations with partners with highly sought-after 
resources that shape the resource-based competitive advantage of the venture (Alvarez-Garrido 
& Dushnitsky, 2015). In doing so, we address the inadequate attention given to the use of 
signaling theory to the strategic question of “who partners with whom” and its performance 
implications. This section focuses on two valuable intangible assets of exchange partners: 
organizational reputation and status.  
 While both the status and reputation of a firm are associated with perceived quality, 
research has attempted to delimit them by showing their interdependent, yet distinctive, roles 
in the social construction of markets (Pollock, Lee, Jin, & Lashley, 2015; Sauder, Lynn, & 
Podolny, 2012; Washington & Zajac, 2005). Washington & Zajac (2005: 283) summarize the 
key theoretical differences as follows: “Status is fundamentally a sociological concept that 





based awards), while reputation is fundamentally an economic concept that captures 
differences in perceived or actual quality or merit that generate earned, performance-based 
rewards.” Whereas status reflects the position of a firm in a social hierarchy based on patterns 
of affiliations with those firms central in market networks (Podolny, 1993; Washington & 
Zajac, 2005), reputation reflects expectations of a firm’s future behavior based on observations 
of, or direct prior experience with, the firm. Additionally, status relates to perceived quality, 
particularly when uncertainty is high and quality is less directly observable than connections 
(Sauder et al., 2012). In contrast, reputation rests on a proven track record of delivering quality 
products or services. Research delimiting status and reputation in the VC context (e.g., Pollock 
et al., 2015) has considered the status of a VC firm as influenced by the status of the investors 
with whom the VC firm affiliates and the reputation of a VC firm as its ability to successfully 
exit portfolio ventures. 
The Mediating Role of the Status of New Joining Investors 
Withdrawal of VC investment ties decreases the likelihood of new joining VCs possessing high 
status. With uncertainty about market opportunities and the set of decisions that will best help 
realize those opportunities, it might be difficult for potential investors to know which 
opportunities or combination of exchange relations to pursue to achieve market success. 
Although new ventures prioritize collaboration with high-status VCs to benefit from their 
advantageous network positions as well as their legitimacy and visibility (Hallen, 2008; 
Milanov & Shepherd, 2013), high-status VCs have many opportunities to allocate their scarce 
resources and must be selective. For instance, Podolny (2001) finds that high-status VC firms 
tend to avoid those investments with greater uncertainty. Indeed, allocating resources to the 
wrong opportunities can generate negative associations for VC firms, thereby undermining 
their status. Ventures with VC withdrawal elicit higher uncertainty than others, thus placing 





Overall, VC withdrawal increases adverse selection risks, and considering that high-status VCs 
are highly selective, they further shy away from such ventures. Naturally, this means that the 
pool of remaining potential VC investors is comprised of those with lower status. 
Affiliation with prominent VCs enhances the market valuation of new ventures because 
it signals that the new venture has superior prospects, resources, capabilities, and market 
opportunities for the following reasons (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Lee, Pollock, & Jin, 2011; 
Ozmel et al., 2013; Pollock et al., 2010). First, prominent VCs have superior capabilities when 
selecting promising ventures and providing value-added services. Prominent VCs are better 
able to conduct due diligence by benefiting from their extensive information channels that are 
empowered by their connections in the VC syndicate networks. Additionally, prominent VCs 
attract better investment opportunities (Hsu, 2006). Given that they have achieved prominence 
through a series of prudent judgments about which ventures to back, their affiliation with a 
focal venture presumably represents another positive judgment.  
Second, prominent VCs value their status highly and will act to reinforce their standing 
(Carter & Manaster, 1990) in order to continue to enjoy the considerable advantages thereof 
(Podolny, 1994, 2001). Prominent VCs are quite selective when investing in entrepreneurial 
ventures, since investing in lower-quality ventures places a VC’s own status at risk. To 
maintain other investors’ trust in their decisions, high-status VCs put a lot of effort into making 
the right investment decisions (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2004, 2006), as evidenced by 
studies that document the superior performance associated with backing from prominent VCs 
(Hochberg et al., 2007). When it is costly to form and maintain inter-organizational 
relationships with prominent VCs, these relationships can generate important signals about a 
new venture’s resources and prospects (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Ozmel et al., 2013). The 
signaling role of prominent VCs in enhancing the market valuation of investee firms  is mostly 





2003; Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Pollock et al., 2010; Stuart et al., 
1999).7 Therefore, we suggest that one reason that VC withdrawal decreases venture valuation 
relates to how it deters prospective high-status VCs from joining the syndicate. 
Hypothesis 4. New joining VCs possessing high status partially mediate the 
relationship between the withdrawal of VC investment ties and the valuation of the 
venture in the follow-on round of financing. 
The Mediating Role of the Reputation of New Joining Investors 
Withdrawal of VC investment ties decreases the likelihood of new joining VCs possessing high 
reputations. Two observations help us understand why high-reputation VCs would be reluctant 
to pursue ventures with withdrawal. First, risking their reputation might create career concerns 
and lower than expected compensation, especially for VCs with high reputations. The 
reputations of VC firms (e.g., past performances in terms of taking portfolio ventures public) 
influence their ability to raise new funds and affects the amount of funds available for future 
investments (Gompers, 1996). A VC fund’s past performance influences the inflow of new 
money (Sirri & Tufano, 1998), and because (like other fund management companies) VCs are 
typically compensated by a fixed percentage of assets under management, they have financial 
incentives to increase their total assets under management. Second, VCs with high past 
performance are more attractive syndicate partners (Lerner, 1994) and their “merit-related” 
visibility enables them to increase their exposure to more opportunities across industries and 
markets (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). In this sense, to protect their reputation as a valuable asset, 
these VCs would be reluctant to pursue ventures with greater perceived risk, e.g., due to 
withdrawal.  
 
7 With less research focusing on the valuation of ventures prior to the IPO when the value of signals is 





 New ventures attempt to seek ties with high-reputation VCs to reap the greater 
substantive benefits offered by them, such as boosting research and development alliances 
(Hsu, 2006) and increasing the likelihood of going public (Hsu, 2006; Sorensen, 2007). Hsu 
(2004) reports that entrepreneurs are three times more likely to accept offers made by high-
reputation VCs. The involvement of reputable VCs likely contributes to enhancing the structure 
and governance of new ventures (perhaps through monitoring via participation in their boards 
of directors) (Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2003; Wasserman, 2003) as well 
as helping to develop the business (Brander et al., 2002; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). 
Additionally, high-reputation VCs possess a screening ability that is almost twice as important 
as their value-added capabilities in explaining their performance track record (Sorenson, 2007). 
Thus, starting relationships with high-reputation VCs conveys the fact that new ventures have 
earned a positive evaluation, thereby boosting venture valuations and indicating that the 
venture has a higher probability of success. Therefore, we hypothesize that the reluctance of 
high-reputation VCs to join the syndicate partially accounts for the direct negative effect of 
signaling associated with VC withdrawal on venture valuation.  
Hypothesis 5. New joining VCs possessing high reputation partially mediate the 
relationship between the withdrawal of VC investment ties and the valuation of the 
venture in the follow-on round of financing. 
METHODS 
Data and Sample 
We use the SDC Platinum database to build our sample of VC-backed ventures. This is one of 
the main commercial databases used by researchers (Gompers & Lerner, 1999). The dataset 
includes information on investments (investment round date, valuation, amount, and VCs 
involved), VCs (affiliation, founding date, and geographic location), and ventures (industry, 





VC rounds of financing in the US from 1980 to 2014. We apply the following filters to the 
data. First, we include ventures that were less than 10 years old when they received their first 
round of investment. Second, we limit our investigation to the influence of VC withdrawal at 
the second round of investment. These two filters provide us with reassurance that other signals 
that can accrue over time do not confound our results: these could include sales track records 
or meeting additional milestones in later rounds of financing. Third, to obtain reliable measures 
of successful exits for the ventures in our sample, we limit the sample to ventures that received 
their first round of investment prior to 2007 in order to allow at least seven years for an eventual 
exit from the venture (prior to 2014).8 Fourth, to calculate the reputation and status of each VC, 
we allow five years to pass from the beginning of the studied period in 1980, thereby restricting 
the sample to include only those ventures whose second round of investment was held after 
1985. Fifth, we focus on investments in ventures located in the top five states in terms of VC 
funding (California, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas). In our database, 
more than 70% of the observations concern ventures in the top five states, suggesting that VCs 
are most active there. This geographical choice also reflects the potential concerns about the 
quality of data in smaller states. Given the competitiveness of these submarkets, to guarantee 
high-quality deal flows VCs tend to be “embedded” in their networks (Granovetter, 1985), 
which is a necessary condition for the efficient transfer and dissemination of information (VCs 
are immediately informed about the interactions of their syndicate partners with third parties).9 
Sixth, we exclude observations (rounds) in which at least one investor is labeled an 
“undisclosed firm” in our dataset, because we identify the withdrawing VCs by the VC names 
provided by SDC Platinum. We check whether this filtering raises representativeness issues by 
 
8 As a robustness check, we included ventures that received the first round of financing before 2010, 
and the results are very similar. 
9 To show that our results are robust to the geographical selection choice, we repeat our analysis of 
ventures on (i) all the states or (ii) alternatively, the two largest states in terms of VC activities (California and 





comparing the distributions of investments across industries and states. In both cases, the 
deviation from the full sample is non-significant (the Chi-squares are 3.40 [n.s.] and 2.09 [n.s.], 
respectively). Finally, following Guler (2007) and Gompers and Lerner (1999), we correct the 
problem of overstating the rounds of financing in the SDC database by counting the separately 
recorded investments that occur in time intervals shorter than 90 days as one round. By 
applying the preceding filters, we obtain a final sample of 2,181 ventures. However, for the 
analysis related to valuation, we only use the 535 ventures with complete valuation data. 
Variables 
 Valuation. This variable indicates the pre-money valuation of the venture in the second 
round of funding (in millions of US dollars, applying 2012 values). We log this variable to 
reduce skewness. Following prior research (Cumming & Dai, 2013), for robustness we use 
Round size, the amount of funding, as an alternative indirect proxy for valuation, which also 
increases the sample size. For the subsample with the valuation data, the correlation between 
Round size and Valuation is 75%. Round size, however, confounds valuation and the venture’s 
cash needs. To the extent that including covariates, such as the stage of development and 
industry of the venture, captures some variance related to cash needs, then Round size can be a 
relevant proxy of valuation. 
 VC withdrawal. When at least one of the existing VCs withdraws from the follow-on 
round of financing, we code the observation related to that round of investment as VC 
withdrawal. When a VC does not participate in the follow-on round of investment, VC 
withdrawal equals 1 and 0 otherwise. We have only included the withdrawal by independent 
VC firms. 
 Early stage. We use a binary variable to indicate whether, in the second round, the 
development stage of the venture is Early stage (VentureXpert categories of “Seed stage” and 





 Outside round. We generate a binary variable that is equal to 1 when a new VC joins 
the second round and 0 otherwise. 
 VC status. A good proxy for VC status is centrality in syndicate networks (Guler, 2007; 
Hallen, 2008; Podolny, 2001; Pollock et al., 2015). We operationalized VC status using 
eigenvector centrality. In essence, eigenvector centrality measures the degree to which a focal 
actor is well connected to other well-connected actors in a given network of relationships 
(Bonacich, 1987). To create this measure, we used available data on all the VCs in our database, 
not just our sample. We constructed adjacency matrices that represent whether VCs are 
adjacent to other VCs (have co-invested in a venture) in the prior five years. Next, we calculate 
the largest eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue of the adjacency matrices. The 
eigenvector centrality assigns a higher score to a VC that has syndicated with VCs that have 
higher centrality scores (Pollock et al., 2015). The measure (VC centrality) is used as the 
maximum eigenvector centrality of all joining VCs. If there is no joining VC, we replace this 
value with zero.10 
 VC reputation. We use two measures that capture the quality of outputs based on the 
track records of VCs (Lee et al., 2011). These measures include the total number of rounds in 
which they have invested in portfolio ventures (VC general experience) and the number of 
portfolio ventures taken public (VC IPO experience). These measures are both based on the 
five years prior to the focal round of investment. Although correlated, these measures represent 
distinctive indicators of VC performance.11 First, the total number of rounds in which a VC has 
invested (VC general experience) captures the intensity of a VC’s investment activity 
(Gompers et al., 2009). In addition to generating knowledge and experience for the VC, 
investment activity enhances the VC’s visibility by bringing it into contact with more 
 
10 To ensure the robustness of the findings to this choice, we repeated our mediation analysis using only 
ventures that received outside round. The results remain similar and are available upon request. 
11 We also used two other measures of reputation: Fund size and VC age. The results remain similar 





investment opportunities and other VCs. Second, the number of portfolio ventures taken public 
(VC IPO experience) captures the extent to which VCs are able to select the most promising 
ventures (Lee & Wahal, 2004) and add value to them in order to achieve a successful exit. 
Taking portfolio ventures public generates the majority of returns for investment funds, thus 
influencing the VC’s ability to raise follow-on funds. These measures are used as maximum 
VC general experience and VC IPO experience of all joining VCs. If there is no joining VC, 
we replace these values with zero. 
 We include several variables to control for the characteristics of investors in the second 
round, the venture, and the market conditions. Regarding investors, we control for Syndicate 
size, which represents the number of VCs in the second round of investment. Syndicated 
investments may perform better by pooling the resources and expertise of syndicate members 
(Gompers & Lerner, 1999).  
Regarding venture characteristics, we control for investment size in the first round. First 
round size is logged to reduce right-skewness (in millions of US dollars, applying 2012 
values).12 To control for a venture’s geographical location, we include a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for California and 0 otherwise. We also control for industry fixed effects using the 
following industry classifications in SDC Platinum: Biotechnology, Communications, 
Computer Hardware, Computer Software, Consumer-Related, Industrial/Energy, Internet-
Specific, Medical/Health, Semiconductors, and Other (the omitted category). 
We control for general market conditions. First, we control for the size of the IPO 
market (IPO market size). In the year of VC investment, we count the number of IPOs (data 
sourced from Professor Jay Ritter’s webpage at https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/) 
and log this variable. In the year of investment, we also count the number of VC rounds (and 
 
12 The ideal control would be the first-round valuation. We are unable to use this variable because of 





log this variable) to proxy the number of investment opportunities available in the market (VC 
market size). Finally, we include year fixed effects.  
Endogeneity of VC Withdrawal 
In the hypothesized relationships in this paper, unobservable factors (e.g., the quality of the 
venture) could influence both the decision of the withdrawing VC and the valuation, which 
would make the VC withdrawal endogenous. The “private information” channel biases the 
theoretically motivated effect of the “adverse selection” channel. Hence, ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates will likely be biased because they will capture both the average treatment 
effect of VC withdrawal and the bias caused by not controlling for the unobserved quality of 
the venture. For instance, a venture with lower unobserved quality in the second round of 
investment is more likely to both incur VC withdrawal and to receive a lower valuation.  
 To correct for this potential bias, we use the Heckman (1979) treatment effects model, 
taking into account the binary nature of our treatment. It is a special form of the Heckman 
selection model in which the outcome of the entire sample is observed as opposed to the 
outcomes of the “treatment,” as in the case of a selection model. Treatment effect models are 
distinct from sample selection models (for a discussion on this, see Li & Prabhala, 2007). 
Treatment effect models include the endogenous dummy variable as an independent regressor. 
Furthermore, for any given venture, we observe the outcome of a choice but not the outcomes 
of unmade choices. This missing information may result in a selection bias due to observables 
(e.g., failing to take into account observable characteristics, such as a venture’s stage of 
development) or a selection bias due to unobservables. In addressing selection bias due to 
unobservables, Heckman (1979) proposes a two-step approach (for binary treatment choices) 
that estimates a choice model in the first stage. Following this estimation, a bias correction 
term (also known as the inverse Mills ratio [IMR]) is calculated and included in the second 





to correct for the endogeneity of binary treatments due to unobservables (Vella & Verbeek, 
1999).  
To identify exclusion restrictions in Heckman’s two-step approach, we use two 
variables. First, we use Other state deal growth. This variable measures the change in the 
annual total round of the VC investments between the year of the first investment round and 
the year of the second investment round in the state in which the first-round VCs were located 
(if the VCs were not in the same state as the investee ventures). This variable is set to 0 if the 
first-round VC and firm are from the same state, or if the first and second investment rounds 
are held within less than one year.13 We calculate this variable for each of the VCs involved in 
the first round of investment and take their maximum value to denote Other state deal growth. 
The idea is that when VCs have more investment opportunities in their own state, they have a 
greater incentive to focus their investments locally (e.g., to benefit from their information 
advantage), holding everything else constant.  
Here is an illustration. Assume that a VC from the state of New York invests in the first 
investment round of a venture located in California in 2004. In 2005, when the venture is raising 
a second round of investment, the investment opportunities increase in the state of New York. 
The VC located there is more likely to withdraw its investment in California and is perhaps 
induced to focus on the growing opportunities in New York. This is true because proximity 
between VCs and their portfolio ventures allows the former to decrease their monitoring costs 
and provide better value-added services (Cumming & Dai, 2010; Lerner, 1995), an explanation 
that is consistent with the documented local bias of VC investors. The ideal instrument to 
identify the causal impact of VC withdrawal would be to randomize it, as this ensures no 
systematic ex-ante differences between ventures with experience of VC withdrawal and those 
 
13 In the case of foreign VCs, we calculate Canadian VC activities at the Canadian provincial level (due 





without. However, the exclusion restriction necessitates that the variable Other state deal 
growth be solely uncorrelated with the unobserved quality of the focal venture. There is no 
reason to believe that changes in investment opportunities in another state (in our example, the 
state of New York) relate to the unobserved quality of the focal venture (in our example, a 
venture located in the state of California). The opportunity set of the out-of-state VC varies 
(owing to greater VC demand in its home state since its initial investment in the focal venture), 
regardless of the underlying quality of the portfolio venture. Hence, this variable satisfies the 
requirements of both relevance and exogeneity. It is noteworthy to add that Other state deal 
growth in our data is not correlated with our performance-related dependent variables but is 
correlated with VC withdrawal (0.19, p < 0.001). 
Second, we use Distance, which refers to the maximum in the set of geographic 
distances between first-round VCs and the venture. Geographical proximity between VCs and 
ventures reduces the level of information asymmetry and increases the probability of VC 
financing; like other investors, VCs tend to invest locally owing to their information advantage 
(Cumming & Dai, 2010; Lerner, 1995; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). On the one hand, VCs with 
geographical proximity can spend more time on-site and increase their involvement and 
support through frequent interactions with ventures (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). On the other 
hand, VCs without such proximity should possess certain abilities or characteristics (e.g., 
greater experience or reputation) that motivate them to invest from a distance (and those 
characteristics should enable them to overcome geographic barriers once they invest). Ex ante, 
it would not be rational for a VC to have invested in a distant venture unless it expected that it 
would to be able to overcome the geographical barriers inherent in selection and value-added 
ex post (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Thus, we expect an equivocal relationship between 
performance and distance (conditional on investment by a distant VC). Despite the potentially 





withdrawal (0.16, p < 0.001) but not correlated with the financial and non-financial outcomes 
in our sample. If we exclude this variable from our analysis, our results remain similar.14 We 
log this variable to suggest decreasing the marginal costs of distance, following prior work 
(Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). 
As additional controls in the treatment equation, we use Syndication diversity. To 
address concerns over heterogeneity in organizational affiliation and potential conflicts of 
interest from pursuing different objectives, Syndication diversity counts the number of first-
round VCs with different affiliations (these include Independent VC, Corporate VC, Bank-
related VC, Angels Groups, and others). This variable can obtain a value between 1 and 5 
(alternatively, we use syndicate size).15  
RESULTS 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and the pairwise correlation matrix. About 24.3% of 
the ventures experienced VC withdrawal.  
[Table 1 and Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the multivariate analysis. We first check the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) and find little concern for issues of multicollinearity in our estimates (VIF values 
are less than 5). As discussed before, because the OLS estimate can be biased due to the 
endogeneity arising from VC withdrawal, we employ the Heckman treatment effects model to 
obtain unbiased estimates of VC withdrawal.  
 
14 To operationalize 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 , following Cumming and Dai (2010), we calculated the geographical 
distance using a great circle equation: 𝑑𝑖𝑗 = 3,963 𝐴𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑠[sin(𝑙𝑡𝑖) sin(𝑙𝑡𝑗) + cos(𝑙𝑡𝑖) cos(𝑙𝑡𝑗) cos(𝑙𝑔𝑖 −
𝑙𝑔𝑗)] , where 𝑑𝑖𝑗  is the distance in miles between VC 𝑖 and venture 𝑗; 𝑙𝑡 and 𝑙𝑔 are latitude and longitude, 
respectively, in radians for each zip code obtained from the US Census Bureau’s Gazetteer 
(http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/gazetteer.html). For foreign VCs, we collected the latitude and 
longitude of the capital of the country in which the VC is based. Among the set of first-round VCs, Distance is 
the largest value of 𝑑𝑖𝑗 .  
15 In an unreported analysis, we use several other variables: (i) the age of the oldest fund among VCs (the 
older fund might be closer to the end of its life and have less money left to invest), (ii) differences between the 
sizes of funds in the first round (size differences might imply divergent portfolio approaches and risk exposures, 
see Nanda & Rhodes-Kropf, 2017), and (iii) differences between the sizes of funds in the first round. The results 






Panel B of Table 2 shows the results of the first-stage estimates (treatment equation), 
which predict the probability of VC withdrawal and are used to estimate the IMR, denoted by 
Lambda in the tables. Panel A of Table 2 shows the results of the second-stage estimates. Model 
1 of Panel A (N = 535) suggests that VC withdrawal has a negative effect on the Valuation (b 
= –0.418, p < 0.05), providing support for H1. In terms of economic magnitude, VC withdrawal 
reduces the Valuation by 34.1% in comparison with ventures that enjoy the continued 
commitment of all existing investors (comparison group). For a robustness check, we reapply 
the Heckman treatment effects model on Round size (N = 2,181) and present the estimates in 
Model 2 in Table 2 (Panels A and B). The results remain consistent and support H1. VC 
withdrawal reduces the Round size by 61.6% (b = –0.956, p < 0.01). 
We note some significant relationships in Models 1 and 2 in Panel B, Table 2. In 
predicting the likelihood of VC withdrawal, Other state deal growth (p < 0.1) and Distance are 
positive (p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively). Additionally, Syndication diversity is positive (p 
< 0.01), indicating that a possible goal mismatch between investors with different affiliations 
(e.g., independent investors, corporate investors, etc.) is associated with a higher likelihood of 
VC withdrawal. Following Cameron and Triveldi (2009), we also use two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) to show that our results are robust to the choice of specification. These results are 
presented in Appendix 1. A benefit of using 2SLS is its ability to test whether VC withdrawal 
is endogenous, given our choice of instruments. We use the Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) 
test. Under the null hypothesis, VC withdrawal is exogenous. The DWH test suggests that we 
can reject the exogeneity of VC withdrawal (p = 0.023). Furthermore, the F-statistic obtained 
from first-stage regression (28.043) is larger than the critical value of 10, which indicates that 
our instrumental variables are not weak (Stock & Yogo, 2005). We further show that our model 
does not violate the overidentifying restriction, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 





preceding statistics reassure us that the instrumental variables are relevant and valid. The 
results obtained from this exercise further support our prior findings. 
To test H2, we include an interaction between VC withdrawal and Early stage dummy 
(Model 3 in Table 2). The interaction coefficient is negative and statistically significant (b = -
0.287, p < 0.1), which supports H2. Because there are inconsistency concerns over interactions 
involving one endogenous variable that might produce biased estimates (Wooldridge, 2010:, 
we split the sample and redo the previous analysis based on whether the venture is in the Early 
stage or not. Like the results of Model 3, Models 4 and 5 suggest that the negative effect of VC 
withdrawal is greater in economic magnitude for early-stage ventures (Model 4: b = -1.106, p 
< 0.1) than late-stage ventures (b = -0.230, n.s.). Further unreported tests also show that the 
negative effect of withdrawal is only statistically significant in subsamples composed of the 
second round of investments, but not in later rounds. 
Now we turn our attention to the mediation effects proposed in H3, H4, and H5. To test 
the mediation effect, we employ the method first used by Baron and Kenny (1986) that specifies 
OLS regression models. However, we modify this method and use the Heckman treatment 
model because our main independent variable (VC withdrawal) is endogenous. Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) procedure involves estimating three separate regression equations. In the first 
step, Valuation is regressed on VC withdrawal and the control variables (Table 3, Model 5).16 
In the second step, we regress mediating variables on VC withdrawal (Table 3, Models 1–4). 
The mediating variables include outside round, VC centrality, VC general experience, and VC 
IPO experience. In the final step of the mediation analysis, Valuation is regressed on VC 
withdrawal, mediating variables, and the control variables (Table 3, Models 6–9). While VC 
withdrawal influences VC valuation and mediating factors in the two initial steps, to establish 
 
16 This model is identical to Model 1 in Table 2; however, we report it again to facilitate visual 





mediation, the effect of VC withdrawal on Valuation is also smaller in absolute terms when 
mediators are included (step 3), compared with the exclusion of mediators (step 1).  
[Table 3 about here] 
The results presented in Table 3 (Models 1–4) indicate that VC withdrawal has negative and 
statistically significant effects on all mediators: Outside round (b = -0.230, p < 0.05), VC 
centrality (b = -0.024, p < 0.05), VC general experience (b = -1.343, p < 0.05), and VC IPO 
experience (b = -0.648, p < 0.05). When including these mediators in a regression of valuation 
on VC withdrawal in Table 3 (Models 6–9), we find that the effect of VC withdrawal on venture 
valuation reduces in absolute terms relative to models excluding these mediators (Model 5 
compared with Models 6–9). Note that mediators have positive and statistically significant 
effects on valuation, as expected. For further robustness tests, we repeat the same analysis on 
the larger sample (N = 2,181) using Round size as the main dependent variable. The results 
(Appendix 2) are like those presented in Table 3. This analysis is especially important since 
small samples may not meet the distributional assumptions underlying mediation tests like the 
Sobel test (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007). In our test of the mediation effect, we also use 
bootstrapping as proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2004). The test confirms the statistical 
significance of the mediating effects of Outside round (z = -5.17, p < 0.01), VC centrality (z = 
-4.914, p < 0.01), VC general experience (z = -6.339, p < 0.01), and VC IPO experience (z = -
6.253, p < 0.01).17 
Alternative Explanations, Additional Analysis, and Robustness Checks 
We discuss a few alternative explanations for H1. The foremost issue is the challenge of 
distinguishing between the “private information” channel and the “adverse selection” channel. 
In addition to our efforts to treat “private information” on venture quality revealed after 
 
17 For robustness, we repeated the Sobel test on the small sample as well (N = 535). The test confirms 
the mediating effects of outside round (z = -1.96, p = 0.050), VC centrality (z = -1.91, p = 0.056), VC general 





investment as an omitted variable, and by using appropriate specifications such as Heckman 
treatment models or 2SLS to address potential endogeneity due to omitted variable bias, a few 
other observations and tests are worthy of mention. First, we obtain similar results when we 
restrict our analysis to the subsample of ventures that have successfully exited (IPO or Merger 
& Acquisition). This sample is comprised of ex-post, high-quality ventures that were less likely 
to be at risk of performing poorly at the time of VC withdrawal. Thus, to the extent that reasons 
unrelated to low (expected) performance motivated the withdrawal (for this subsample of 
ventures), the negative effect of withdrawal should be taken as evidence of the “adverse 
selection” channel. Second, since we cannot directly observe the private information known by 
the investor leaving the syndicate, our best effort is to find proxies that potentially correlate 
with it. One candidate is the long-term outcome of the venture. Controlling for Successful exit 
in the treatment equations captures some of the unobservable “private information.” We obtain 
similar results. Accordingly, our current results should be net of “private information,” which 
is correlated with Successful exit.  
Third, we suspect that more “private information” is the most important driver of VC 
withdrawal. A proxy for the availability of information or the ease of access to such information 
is the proximity of the investor to the venture. Our first-stage regressions predicting who leaves 
the syndicate suggest that an investor’s likelihood of withdrawal increases with distance. 
Therefore, if anything, the data seems to suggest that less “private information” (either positive 
or negative) is more likely to be associated with withdrawal. To corroborate this further, since 
Distance measures the most distant investor among the syndicate members (operationalized as 
a round-level construct), we perform a venture fixed-effect analysis at the level of venture 
round–VC (and measure distance in the dyad VC firm–venture). To illustrate, if five different 
VCs participated in the first funding round, we have five observations for that venture round. 





the venture. The results (available from authors upon request) again show that more distant 
VCs within a syndicate are more likely to withdraw their investment from a venture of given 
quality.18 Our further investigations show that 86% (81%) of VCs in our sample that withdraw 
their investment are located more than 100 (200) miles away from the venture. Per prior 
research (e.g., Lerner, 1995), VCs located more than 100 miles from the venture are less likely 
to be board members and thus less likely to be involved in the daily activities of the venture. 
Hence, it is less likely that distant VCs that withdraw do so because of their access to more 
private information.  
Fourth, lead VCs (defined as the VCs that invested the largest amount in prior rounds 
of investment) actively participate in the day-to-day activities of the venture and sit on the 
board of directors (Lerner, 1995). Hence, they are more likely to have more “private 
information.” We use sub-sample analysis to compare withdrawal by lead VCs and withdrawal 
by non-lead VCs. The results (available from authors upon request) show that there is no 
statistically significant difference in the negative effects between withdrawal by lead and non-
lead VCs. 
Fifth, for further methodological robustness, we employ propensity score matching to 
test H1. The rationale is as follows. Ventures with and without the experience of VC 
withdrawal could differ on both observable and unobservable characteristics (that is, ventures 
that experience VC withdrawal may not be a random sample of ventures). The technique of 
propensity score matching allows us to create, based on observable characteristics, “twin” 
ventures without the experience of VC withdrawal (control group) but that are as similar as 
possible to the ventures experiencing VC withdrawal (treatment group). The underlying 
assumption is that variation in unobservables and their influence (e.g., private information) is 
 
18 We also find (controlling for venture quality) the variable Other state deal growth is positively 
correlated to VC withdrawal, which increases our confidence in the choice of Other state deal growth as a 





lower when both groups have similar observables. We considered the first nearest neighbor 
and used all the control variables (listed in Table 2) in a probit estimation of the treatment 
group. After checking that the treatment and control groups were balanced, we ran Heckman 
treatment regressions (Appendix 3). The results provide similar evidence in support of H1, 
albeit statistically non-significant results for valuation due to the small sample size. 
Sixth, we also employ a difference-in-difference strategy inspired by Townsend (2015), 
who has shown that VCs with higher exposure to the Internet industry became more likely to 
withdraw their investment in non-information technology related ventures after the burst of the 
Dot Com bubble. This observation allows for exploiting the Internet exposure of VCs as a 
treatment variable in a difference-in-difference framework. More formally, Internet exposure 
for each VC firm is the share of the focal VC investments in the Internet sector in the 10 years 
prior to March 31, 2000 , the peak of the Dot Com bubble (Townsend, 2015). Given our interest 
in all the investors involved in the first investment round, we define Internet exposure as the 
maximum value of Internet exposure for VCs that participated in the first round of investment. 
Furthermore, we limit our sample to non-IT entrepreneurial ventures that received their first 
round of investment in the pre-bubble period (March 31, 1997 to March 30, 2000) and their 
second round of investment in the post-bubble period (March 31, 2000 to March 31, 2003). 
The data filtered comprise 340 observations (170 ventures). Thus, each venture appears twice, 
in which the first round is prior to the bubble and the second round is after the bubble. This 
identification strategy also allows us to include venture fixed effects, controlling for the 
ventures’ time-invariant characteristics. The estimation results are presented in Appendix 4. 
We obtain the negative treatment effect (p < 0.05) in both the models without and with the 
venture fixed effect (Models 1 and 2, respectively).19 These results are consistent with our prior 
 






findings and show that non-IT ventures that received investment in the first round of investment 
from VCs with higher Internet exposure experience a lower Round size in the second 
investment round. Given that diffusion of the shock in the private investment market of Internet 
ventures to non-IT sectors is unlikely to reflect the change in the quality of the investee venture 
(with withdrawing experience), our results suggest that VC withdrawal, which is more likely 
in the treatment group, as shown by Townsend (2015), has negative implications for the ability 
of the ventures in that group (non-IT) to raise subsequent financing. 
We now explore some other issues that may have confounded our results (the estimates 
are available upon request.). First, we control for the investment that the withdrawing VC made 
in the first round to address the concern that withdrawal may lead to a financing gap and that 
the syndicate will have less money to contribute to the second funding round.20 The results 
remain similar. Second, because we only observe the outcome of VC withdrawal for the 
ventures that receive at least a second round of financing, our results might be subject to sample 
selection bias. To address this issue, we employ the Heckman selection model. In the first stage, 
we estimate whether the venture receives more than one round of financing in a probit 
specification; next, we obtain and include the IMR in the second-stage regression. After 
controlling for sample selection, the results are very similar to the main analysis.  
Long-term Performance Implications of VC Withdrawal  
Unlike the extensive evidence of signals in entrepreneurship and management, few studies have 
assessed the influence of signals over time (e.g., Gulati and Higgins, 2003). The theoretical 
expectation is that the effects of signals deteriorate once evaluators can obtain additional new 
disconfirming information or can acquire direct experience (Pollock & Gulati, 2007). 
Therefore, the long-term performance of the venture is unlikely to be tarnished by its VC 
withdrawal experience if the theoretical channel of the VC withdrawal effect is “adverse 
 





selection” and the availability of new information over time compensates for the temporary 
negative perceptions of the venture’s quality. However, it is possible that the long-term 
performance of new ventures is adversely affected by lack of access to high-quality investors 
(triggered by VC withdrawal) (Sorenson, 2007), which is supported by studies that document 
the superior performance associated with backing from prominent VCs (Hochberg et al., 2007).  
 To test which effect prevails, we investigate whether there are statistically significant 
differences in the successful exits of ventures depending on VC withdrawal. Our estimates 
indicate no statistically significant relationship between VC withdrawal and the successful exit 
(defined as IPO or M&A) of the venture (Appendix 5). We also manually collected data on the 
date of IPO or M&A and estimated the hazard of success (i.e., the average time between the 
second round of investment and exit is 1,542 days). Like the probability of success, the hazard 
of success is not statistically different. Similarly, Townsend (2015) finds that while the 
propagation of financial shock reduces the hazard of receiving a new round of VC financing, 
it does not have any statistically significant effect on the hazard of success. Overall, many other 
events could influence the exit outcome after the second round of investment, and our evidence 
suggests that the effect of VC withdrawal is less pronounced over time as more tangible 
information surfaces. 
Heterogeneity of Withdrawing VC  
The signaling role of affiliation with prestigious third parties, such as high-status VCs, in 
enhancing the market valuation of ventures is widely documented in empirical studies of 
entrepreneurial ventures nearing IPO (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Pollock et al., 2010; Stuart et 
al., 1999). Such affiliations can send signals of a venture’s quality by certification and 
endorsement, especially when direct indicators of quality are missing or difficult to observe 
(Sanders & Boivie, 2004). Here, the signaling costs are borne largely by the third parties given 





venture. Therefore, we hypothesize that the withdrawal of investment ties from high-status VCs 
decreases the valuation of the venture in the follow-on round of financing more than the 
withdrawal of low-status VC investment ties.  
 To investigate the dependence of Valuation and Round size on the characteristics of the 
withdrawing VC (high-status versus low-status VC withdrawal), we split the sample based on 
the status of the withdrawing VC because in our specifications we can only address one 
endogenous binary treatment variable. Our (unreported) regressions predicting Valuation 
suggest there is no statistically significant difference between High-status VC withdrawal (b = 
-0.364, n.s.) and Low-status VC withdrawal (b = -0.396, n.s.). Similarly, while High-status VC 
withdrawal reduces the Round size by 75% (b = -1.362, p < 0.01), this magnitude is 67% for 
Low-status VC withdrawal (b = -1.181, p < 0.01). These coefficients are not statistically 
different from each other. We suspect that the limited number of High-status VC withdrawals 
(N = 15 and N = 62, depending on whether the dependent variable is Valuation or Round size) 
in the data may reduce the statistical power needed to identify the cross-sectional differences.21  
DISCUSSION 
This study examines the impact of withdrawn relationships on entrepreneurial ventures’ 
performance. We conceptualized how the withdrawal of investment ties disseminates negative 
information, the spread of which negatively impacts the fundraising performance of 
entrepreneurial ventures. Using a dataset covering 22 years of VC investments, we tested our 
conjectures and found support for our predictions. Ventures that experience withdrawal face 
lower valuations and are less able to acquire financial resources, particularly as a result of 
difficulty in partnering with new prospective VCs (especially high-status and high-reputation 
ones). Overall, our study extends the understanding of the financial and non-financial 
 
21 We also have found evidence that withdrawal by high-reputation VCs has a greater effect on a 
venture’s Valuation and Round size than that of low-reputation VCs. However, these differences are not 





performance consequences of new ventures’ ties, formed under uncertainty, that have 
subsequently gone awry. 
This paper offers several contributions. First, we add to the literature on 
discontinuations of inter-organizational relationships. The main focus of this literature has been 
on the antecedents of withdrawals (Greve et al., 2010; Greve et al., 2013; Guler, 2007; Li & 
Chi, 2013; Polidoro, Ahuja, & Mitchell, 2011), giving predictions that are distinct from those 
of tie formation studies. For instance, Li and Chi (2013) highlight the influence of portfolio 
configurations of VCs (such as portfolio diversity) on the propensity to withdraw from a 
portfolio venture. Our study not only complements these studies by highlighting that the 
propensity of tie discontinuation is correlated with factors such as potential principal–principal 
agency conflicts (related to the diverse affiliations of investors in the syndicate) or growth in 
outside options (e.g., nearby investments favored by investors), but our work also adds to the 
limited knowledge of what happens “after the break-up.” Whereas Zhelyazkov and Gulati 
(2016) exceptionally focus on VC firms and find that VC firms that withdraw their investments 
suffer negative relational consequences, which reduces the likelihood of them entering into 
subsequent exchanges, we focus on the consequences of VC withdrawal for entrepreneurial 
ventures. 
Second, our study contributes to research on inter-organizational relationships and 
performance, with an emphasis on entrepreneurial ventures (Baum et al., 2000). Prior work has 
often presented ties as a means of achieving competitive advantage and sustained performance; 
however, given the uncertainties in the development of entrepreneurial ventures, there remain 
circumstances in which these early investment relationships are discontinued (to both parties’ 
detriment). We marshaled new evidence about the potential negative (and perhaps unintended) 
consequences for entrepreneurial ventures when early relationships are discontinued. We 





valuation and its prospective partners. Specifically, we examined how a lack of interest from 
prospective reputable and high-status partners, as two possibly desirable characteristics in a 
partner, mediates the effect of VC withdrawal on valuation. Our theoretical perspective also 
adds to the ongoing conversation about the effects that signals have on (i) financial outcomes, 
mostly studied around the time of IPO (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; 
Sanders & Boivie, 2004; Stuart et al., 1999), and (ii) economic exchanges, such as equity 
financing, alliances, or acquisitions (Hsu, 2006; Ozmel et al., 2013; Pollock et al., 2010; 
Ragozzino & Reuer, 2011). Unlike these previous studies that explore signaling opportunities 
for young or recent-IPO ventures, our study first embraces heterogeneity in the quality of 
exchange partners as a relevant outcome of signaling (i.e., how signals influence tie formation 
with exchange parties possessing high-quality resources). Second, we show that outcomes of 
signaling are interlinked: adverse selection concerns deter partnering with organizations 
possessing more attractive resources, and ultimately the availability of these exchange partners 
mediates the relationship between signals and valuation. 
The present study highlights how non-repetition of ties from some partners in the 
syndicate influences partner selection decisions. Researchers have investigated various 
opportunities and challenges that shape preferences and drive tie formation (Diestre & 
Rajagopalan, 2012; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008; Vissa, 2011), including concerns over 
asymmetric information between partners (Ragozzino & Reuer, 2011). While each party exerts 
efforts to conduct due diligence during the process of initiating the tie, partners with 
knowledge/information pertinent to the partnership  may be unable or unwilling to share it 
(given their natural incentive to misrepresent their prospects in order to entice their partners to 
enter collaborations or command higher prices for their products). Therefore, information 
asymmetries may lead to a combination of the following outcomes: partnerships fail to form 





discounted offer prices (e.g., in acquisitions of equity) because the other side of the exchange 
party confronts the problem of adverse selection. This work highlights how non-repetition of 
ties in the investment syndicate leads to the latter effect, which is partially mediated by the 
former effect (by theorizing that non-repetition of ties conveys potential adverse selection 
risks). This contribution implies a new pathway into how prior patterns of tie formation have a 
lasting influence on future tie formation (Baum, Shipilov, & Rowley, 2003; Chung et al., 2000; 
Gulati, 1995), which complements prior research efforts that emphasize other desirable 
attributes in repeated partners, such as trust and protection against misappropriation risks. 
Because withdrawal induces adverse selection risks for the current investment and impacts the 
short-term prospects of the underlying venture, our results implicitly shed new light onto the 
findings of Zhelyazkov and Gulati (2016) that suggest that withdrawal events can break the 
inertial preference for repeat and structurally proximate ties, which is observed in prior research 
on network churn (Rowley, Greve, Rao, Baum, & Shipilov, 2005).  
 One finding that is worthy of additional discussion relates to how diversely syndicated 
deals are more prone to non-repetition of ties. VC syndicates are characterized as business 
relationships composed of investors with different incentives, objectives, and cash flow rights 
(Nanda & Rhodes-Kropf, 2017). Such arrangements are fraught with frictions that can generate 
potential downsides for investors and entrepreneurs. To illustrate, corporate VCs pursue 
strategic objectives rather than financial returns alone (Dushnitsky, 2012), and incongruent 
objectives among investors may create conflicts of interest over priorities of the venture goals 
and changes in the strategic direction of new ventures. In addition to issues such as potential 
free-riding behavior ensuing from decreased ownership stakes in larger syndicates, co-
ordination costs, such as collective monitoring of the entrepreneurs and controlling managerial 
opportunism, increase with diversity. For these reasons, the positive correlation between 





real consequences for the portfolio ventures, perhaps due to incentive differences and 
coordination frictions within VC syndicates.  
Non-repetition of ties in our context may involve retaining the VC’s (diluted) equity in 
the venture while stopping investment in subsequent rounds. In this case, the VC discontinues 
its investment without terminating its relationship with the syndicate partners. VentureXpert 
does not allow us to distinguish between retention and sale of equity by discontinuing investors. 
Because retention of equity by discontinuing investor(s) in the non-repetition of tie is likely to 
have weaker effects on the valuation compared with the private sale of equity, inclusion of both 
cases would weaken our predictions. For this reason, our empirical estimates are conservative 
given the possible existence of cases in which a VC does not divest its stake after discontinuing. 
Managerial Implications 
Our study may be useful for entrepreneurs and VCs navigating early investment relationships. 
The suggestion to accept investment from high-status VCs may be overly simplistic advice to 
give to entrepreneurs. From a normative standpoint, our results indicate that entrepreneurs 
should be wary of whether VCs view the seed and early-stage investments as cheap options 
(VCs pursuing an “option portfolio” strategy versus investing because they are convinced by, 
and committed to, supporting the venture). Rather, entrepreneurs should choose investors that 
act with conviction and tend to be engaged and committed. Nevertheless, sourcing money from 
a top-tier fund at any point in the development of the venture is a double-edged sword; while 
it maximizes the chances of success, provided that the venture performs well, it can ruin the 
chances of success if the investor (even for idiosyncratic reasons) later decides to discontinue. 
Accordingly, while entrepreneurs can take the money and leverage the advice, status, and 
network, they should be wary that a VC may not back them in the future and that the 
competitive advantage they gain (in recruitment, closing clients or partners, attracting media 





Our results also have some implications for VCs and the syndicate partners they choose. 
VCs need to be careful about choosing their partner(s) to avoid scenarios (such as the one 
studied here) that put their investments at risk of losing opportunities to develop and grow. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Our study’s limitations present several avenues for future research. One is linked to the 
drawbacks of our research setting of one type of intermediary organization (VC), raising the 
question of the extent to which our findings can be generalized to other relationships. Future 
research may profitably explore other relationships (e.g., client relationships, as in Rogan & 
Sorenson, 2014, or alliance relationships) to determine whether negative signals from the 
termination of relationships similarly undermine the focal firm's reliability. There is evidence 
that the spread of negative information (e.g., unethical corporate acts) damages an 
organization’s network partners (Sullivan, Haunschild, & Page, 2007). The dynamics we 
identified may be relevant to environments with extensive uncertainty about the quality of the 
firms. The negative impacts may be less important in environments that offer rich information. 
  
In this paper, we analyzed VC syndicate networks because they are especially important 
networks for new ventures with resource constraints. However, we believe that our arguments 
might be generalized to the networks of alliances for new firms provided that (i) potential 
partners face adverse selection risk and (ii) existing alliance partners are expected to continue 
but dissolve their ties. When these two conditions hold, our hypotheses can be applied to other 
types of inter-organizational relationships, such as alliance relationships. 
In addition, there are other ways that new ventures can signal their value regardless of 
withdrawal (e.g., patenting or enlisting prestigious board members), so it would also be 





type of unexpected termination of relationships, on the ability of ventures to subsequently form 
worthwhile collaborations. 
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Table 1- Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix (N=535) 
Variable Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1. Valuationa 3.587 0.992 ---            
2. Round Sizeab 1.317 1.547 0.75 ---           
3. Outside round 0.705 0.457 0.28 0.46 ---          
4. VC centrality  0.045 0.047 0.23 0.4 0.62 ---         
5.VC general experiencea  3.048 2.328 0.27 0.49 0.85 0.87 ---        
6. VC IPO experiencea 1.362 1.279 0.29 0.46 0.69 0.92 0.89 ---       
7. VC withdrawal 0.243 0.429 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.07 ---      
8. Syndicate size 3.477 2.034 0.4 0.58 0.47 0.49 0.53 0.51 -0.01 ---     
9. Early stage 0.308 0.462 -0.26 -0.18 -0.16 -0.1 -0.14 -0.13 -0.09 -0.15 ---    
10. First round size 1.525 1.164 0.59 0.41 -0.01 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 0.13 0.26 -0.23 ---   
11. California 0.628 0.484 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 ---  
12. IPO market sizea 5.577 0.773 0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.19 0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.2 0.02 --- 
13. VC market sizea 9.202 0.576 0.31 0.3 0.16 0.01 0.12 0.12 -0.07 0.18 -0.02 0.2 -0.02 -0.02 








Table 2- Regression Results of Heckman Treatment Model 
Table 2 provides the estimates for the effect of VC withdrawal on pre-money valuation of 
ventures (Model 1) and Round size (Model 2). Model 3 investigate the moderating effect of 
early stage (H2). Model 5 and 6 test the similar moderating effect using split sample analysis. 
Model 5 includes ventures that are in Early state while model 6 includes ventures that are in 
later stage. Lambda refers to the inverse mills ratio in the Heckman treatment effects models. 
 (1) (2) (3) (5) (4) 
Panel A: Main equation Valuationa Round sizea Valuationa Valuationa Valuationa 





VC withdrawal -0.418** -0.956*** -0.242 -1.106*** -0.230 
 (0.204) (0.178) (0.182) (0.372) (0.243) 
Early stage -0.214*** 0.015 -0.197**   
 (0.069) (0.050) (0.078)   
VC withdrawal × Early stage   -0.287
*   
   (0.163)   
Syndicate size 0.113*** 0.339*** 0.109*** 0.150*** 0.105*** 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.017) (0.031) (0.020) 
First round sizea 0.449*** 0.424*** 0.434*** 0.343*** 0.483*** 
 (0.032) (0.023) (0.032) (0.058) (0.040) 
California 0.194*** 0.352*** 0.154** 0.044 0.265*** 
 (0.066) (0.051) (0.066) (0.114) (0.081) 
IPO market sizea -0.055 -0.085 0.206*** 0.354 -0.134 
 (0.160) (0.093) (0.042) (0.286) (0.188) 
VC market sizea -0.115 0.234 0.253*** -0.823 -0.129 
 (0.547) (0.287) (0.059) (0.849) (0.646) 
Year fixed-effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed-effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Lambda 0.290** 0.535*** 0.342** 0.579*** 0.218 
 (0.126) (0.107) (0.159) (0.219) (0.153) 
N 535 2181 535 165 370 
Wald chi-squared 558.715*** 2229.462*** 493.758*** 132.889*** 411.552*** 
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 







Table 2- Continued 
Panel B: Treatment equation (DV: VC withdrawal) 
      
Other state deal growth 0.058* 0.021* 0.058* 0.027 0.037 
 (0.035) (0.012) (0.035) (0.090) (0.041) 
Distancea 0.119** 0.082*** 0.119** 0.250* 0.100* 
 (0.051) (0.023) (0.051) (0.131) (0.058) 
Syndication diversity 0.824*** 0.704*** 0.824*** 1.045*** 0.775*** 
 (0.131) (0.062) (0.131) (0.315) (0.146) 
First round sizea 0.073 0.119*** 0.073 -0.081 0.105 
 (0.061) (0.028) (0.061) (0.132) (0.073) 
Early and seed stage -0.039 0.032 -0.039 -0.051 0.174 
 (0.136) (0.066) (0.136) (0.270) (0.162) 
California 0.108 -0.022 0.108   
 (0.135) (0.065) (0.135)   
IPO market sizea 0.326** 0.238*** 0.326** 0.055 0.358** 
 (0.127) (0.055) (0.127) (0.275) (0.152) 
VC market sizea -0.015 -0.005 -0.015 -0.381 0.014 
 (0.131) (0.059) (0.131) (0.326) (0.147) 
Crisis YES YES YES YES YES 
Bubble YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES 
N 535 2181 535 165 370 
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 




Table 3- Regression Results of Mediation Effect Using Heckman Treatment Model (N=535) 
Table 3 provides the estimates for the mediation effect of outside round, VC status (VC centrality), and VC reputation (VC general experience, 
and VC IPO experience). All regressions include: Early stage, Syndicate size, first round size, California, IPO market size, VC market size, Year, 
and industry fixed effect.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 










experiencea       
VC withdrawal -0.230** -0.024** -1.343** -0.684**  -0.418
** -0.373* -0.327* -0.321* -0.313* 
 (0.114) (0.011) (0.555) (0.298)  (0.204) (0.200) (0.198) (0.195) (0.195) 
Outside round       0.294
***    
       (0.079)    
VC centrality        3.756
***   
        (0.781)   
VC general experiencea         0.073
***  
         (0.016)  
VC IPO experiencea          0.154
*** 
          (0.030) 
Controls YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
Lambda 0.266*** 0.020*** 1.139*** 0.586***  0.290
** 0.237* 0.215* 0.207* 0.200 
 (0.069) (0.007) (0.341) (0.183)  (0.126) (0.125) (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) 
Wald chi-squared 357.342*** 311.747*** 366.669*** 392.779***  558.715
*** 599.026*** 622.862*** 618.244*** 632.968*** 
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.  








Appendix 1- 2SLS Specification 
This table provides the 2SLS estimates for the effect of VC withdrawal on Valuation (Model 
1) and Round size (Model 2). Estimates of first stage are presented in Model 3 and Model 4. 
 Second stage  First Stage 
 (1) (2) 
 (3) (4) 
  Valuationa Valuationa  VC withdrawal VC withdrawal 
VC withdrawal -0.395** -0.868***    
 (0.195) (0.176)    
Early stage -0.235*** -0.022  -0.045 -0.043** 
 (0.072) (0.053)  (0.040) (0.018) 
Syndicate size 0.099*** 0.313***  -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (0.017) (0.013)  (0.009) (0.004) 
First round sizea 0.453*** 0.426***  0.028 0.038*** 
 (0.032) (0.024)  (0.017) (0.007) 
California 0.199*** 0.361***  0.041 0.003 
 (0.066) (0.050)  (0.037) (0.017) 
IPO market sizea 0.011 -0.101  -0.067 0.008 
 (0.166) (0.096)  (0.054) (0.034) 
VC market sizea -0.284 0.255  0.180** 0.032 
 (0.577) (0.298)  (0.091) (0.059) 
Other state deal growth    0.019
* 0.007** 
    (0.010) (0.003) 
Distance    0.023
* 0.017*** 
    (0.012) (0.005) 
Syndication diversity    0.302
*** 0.256*** 
    (0.038) (0.018) 
Constant 5.126 -1.811  -1.952** -0.500 
 (4.662) (2.400)  (0.767) (0.436) 
Year fixed effect YES YES  YES YES 
Industry fixed effect YES YES  YES YES 
N 535 2181  535 2181 
chi2 553.773*** 2163.689***    
F-statistic   
 28.043*** 90.333*** 
R-square 0.4924 0.4767  0.2098 0.1762 
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 





Appendix 2- Regression Results of Mediation Effect Using Heckman Treatment Model (N=2181) 
Table 3 provides the estimates for the mediation effect of outside round, VC status (VC centrality), and VC reputation (VC general experience, 
and VC IPO experience). All regressions include: Early stage, Syndicate size, first round size, California, IPO market size, VC market size, Year, 
and industry fixed effect.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 










experiencea             
VC withdrawal -0.390*** -0.030*** -1.069*** -2.188***  -0.956
*** -0.601*** -0.713*** -0.520*** -0.597*** 
 (0.074) (0.006) (0.168) (0.339)  (0.178) (0.162) (0.169) (0.163) (0.167) 
Outside round 
      0.909
***    
       (0.052)    
VC centrality 
       8.015
***   
        (0.660)   
VC general experiencea 
        0.199
***  
         (0.012)  
VC IPO experiencea 
         0.336
*** 
          (0.024) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Lambda 
0.355*** 0.023*** 0.838*** 1.738***  0.535
*** 0.212** 0.349*** 0.188* 0.253** 
 (0.044) (0.003) (0.100) (0.201)  (0.107) (0.099) (0.103) (0.100) (0.102) 
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 




Appendix 3- Regression Results of Heckman Treatment Effects – Sample Obtained from 
Propensity Score Matching 
Appendix 3 provides the estimates for the effect of VC withdrawal on Valuation, Round size 
with a sample obtained from propensity score matching. All regressions include: Early stage, 
Syndicate size, first round size, California, IPO market size, VC market size. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Valuation
a Round sizea 
VC withdrawal -0.203 -0.617*** 
 (0.239) (0.215) 
Controls YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Lambda 0.237* 0.346** 
 (0.161) (0.141) 
N 224 960 
Wald chi-squared 253.967*** 877.3096*** 
Note: * p <0.10, p <0.05, *** p <0.01 
a. This variable is logged.  
 
Appendix 4- Difference-in-Difference Estimation  
Model 2(1) does (not) include venture fixed effects. The sample include only non-IT firms. 
Due to very small sample we are not able to repeat the same analysis for valuation. All 
regressions include: Early stage, Syndicate size, first round size, California, IPO market size, VC 
market size. California is dropped from Model 2 due to inclusion of fixed effect. 
  Round sizea 
 (1) (2) 
IT exposure 0.082  
 (0.286)  
Post 0.481* 0.104 
 (0.262) (0.279) 
Post × IT exposure -0.729** -0.684** 
 (0.337) (0.318) 
Controls YES YES 
Venture Fixed effect NO YES 
N 340 340 
No of Firms 170 170 
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 




Appendix 5- Regression Results of Successful Exit and Hazard of Success Using 
Heckman Treatment Model and Cox Model 
This table provides the estimates for the effect of VC withdrawal on Successful exit and Hazard of 
time. Successful exit is defined as IPO or trade sale. Model 1 and 2 are based on the sample with non-
missing Valuation data (N=535), while Model 3 and 4 are based on the sample with non-missing 
Round size data (N=2181).  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Successful exit Hazard of success Successful exit Hazard of success 
VC withdrawal 0.203 -0.021 -0.036 0.050 
 (0.132) (0.140) (0.074) (0.073) 
Early stage -0.001 -0.068 -0.017 -0.077 
 (0.045) (0.134) (0.022) (0.067) 
Syndicate size 0.006 -0.014 0.026*** 0.052*** 
 (0.011) (0.031) (0.005) (0.014) 
First round sizea 0.020 0.119** 0.030*** 0.079*** 
 (0.021) (0.060) (0.010) (0.028) 
California -0.061 -0.119 -0.010 -0.015 
 (0.043) (0.122) (0.021) (0.062) 
IPO market sizea -0.042 -0.012 -0.034 -0.076 
 (0.106) (0.453) (0.040) (0.164) 
VC market sizea 0.190 -0.086 0.105 0.318 
 (0.363) (1.606) (0.125) (0.539) 
Year fixed-effect YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed-effect YES YES YES YES 
Lambda -0.125  0.031  
 (0.082)  (0.045)  
N 535 535 2181 2181 
Model Heckman  Cox Heckman Cox 
Wald chi-squared 108.886*** 81.146*** 328.239*** 232.577*** 
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 
a. This variable is logged. 
 
